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Abstract
In this article we argue that the evaluation and implementation of Canadian ﬁscal policy
could be signiﬁcantly improved through the systematic use of information provided by global
ﬁnancial markets. In particular, we show how the information contained in internationally
traded asset returns can be used to (1) provide a more meaningful cyclical—adjustment of the
budget deﬁcit, (2) assess the sustainability of the public debt, and (3) reduce the risk of the
debt becoming unsustainable without having to run excessively large surpluses.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years Canada’s federal government has experienced historically large and persistent bud-
get surpluses. As Figure 1 shows the overall federal surplus has been positive since the beginning
of 1997. Not only were these surpluses large, they were also massively underestimated (at least
initially) in the forecasts of both the private and public sector. According to some estimates, if
the current trend continues the currently high level of public debt would be reduced to zero within
20 years. Such an outcome is unlikely however given the recent and anticipated reductions in
income and corporate tax rates, and the substantial political pressure for re—investment in health
and education. This situation is the exact opposite of that faced by the federal government in the
1980s. Then, Canada experienced historically large and persistent budget deﬁcits, which were
also massively underestimated. By the mid—1980s the debt—GNP ratio had become so large that
many observers, in both the private and public sector, viewed it as unsustainable.
What caused such big swings in budget balance? The worsening of the ﬁscal position in
Canada is usually associated with Trudeau’s second term and the Mulroney government. The
return to ﬁscal surpluses is typically attributed to the Chretien government and, in particular,
his ﬁnance minister Paul Martin. However, beyond the timing of these episodes, it is not clear
whether it is valid to attribute the blame for deﬁcits and credit for surpluses to these respective
governments. The oil—shocks and global growth slowdown of the mid—1970s and the recessions of
the early eighties were surely factors in the persistent deﬁcits, while the return to higher growth
during the late 1990s may have inﬂuenced the surpluses during that period. Moreover, when
we remove interest payments on the debt and focus only on the primary surplus (see Figure
1), it may be seen that the return to positive primary surpluses actually ﬁrst occurred in 1987.
The subsequent improvement in the overall surplus had much to do with the declining interest
payments on the debt.
In order to evaluate how much of the movement in the surplus is due to signiﬁcant shifts in
the stance of ﬁscal policy, it is necessary to separate out the movements that are due to exogenous
factors, such as business cycles or unanticipated growth slowdowns. Traditionally this has been
done by removing the components that are correlated with deviations in output and unemploy-
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Federal Surplus









Figure 2: Revenue and Spending (non-interest)
2ment from their “natural” levels. However, there are two problems with this approach. First,
the traditional cyclical indicators do not capture much of the exogenous variations in surplus.
Second, since it is likely that variations in these cyclical indicators are inﬂuenced by changes in
ﬁscal policy, it is not clear that the cyclical adjustment is really controlling for exogenous shocks.
In Section 2 we argue that it is conceptually more appealing to use internationally traded asset
returns as instruments to identify the exogenous shocks to the surplus. We demonstrate that this
approach does a much better job than the use of aggregate variables such as GNP growth or un-
employment rates in capturing the ﬂuctuations of the surplus. Using this approach to controlling
for exogenous shocks, we ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant shift in ﬁscal stance seems to have occurred in the
late 1980s and argue that this was likely a response to market pressures to do something about
the public debt. We estimate that there was a tightening of ﬁscal policy between 1987 and 1991,
when the primary surplus averaged more than one percentage point higher than would normally
have been the case given the state of the world.
T h ea p p r o a c ht os h o c ka d j u s t m e n td e v e l o p e di nS e c t i o n2a l s om a k e sp o s s i b l eas i m p l ea n d
ﬂexible way to assess the “sustainability” of the public debt. We argue that the sustainability
of the public debt cannot be simply judged by the debt—GNP ratio. For example, the Canadian
debt—GNP ratio is currently higher than it was in the mid—1980s, but is somehow viewed as
sustainable. Clearly, the degree to which the debt—GNP ratio is sustainable depends on an
assessment of the present value of future surpluses. This in turn depends on current policies,
current forecasts of economic growth and interest rates and the correlation of the surplus with
t h er a t ea tw h i c hf u t u r ec a s hﬂows are discounted. In section 3, we describe how to use our cash—
ﬂow model of the Canadian primary surplus and a calibrated asset pricing model to compute
the present value of the primary surplus. Comparing this with the debt—GNP ratio, using the
mid—1980s as a benchmark, we provide a ﬂexible and easily applied measure of sustainability.
In the absence of state—contingent borrowing and lending, a stable ﬁscal policy may become
unsustainable as the eﬀects of exogenous shocks accumulate and result in a rising debt, which
could force the government to drastically raise taxes and cut spending in order to reduce the
debt. The more volatile is the primary surplus, the more likely it is that the tax rate will
have to be increased in the future. Given the problems of adjusting policy frequently and the
3costs of adjusting them infrequently only after signiﬁcant pressure for change has built up, the
question arises as to whether there may be other ways of minimizing the adverse consequences
of unexpected movements in the ﬁscal budget. In Section 4, we discuss the potential gains from
systematic ﬁscal risk management. Hedging away the volatile component of the primary surplus
that is associated with exogenous shocks might help to reduce the probability of an excessively
large and rising public debt. We discuss the circumstances under which a simple hedging strategy
can increase the sustainability of current ﬁscal policy and generate sizable gains in the nation’s
wealth (as measured by the present value of its current and future GNP) through diversiﬁcation
and lower average tax rates.
2 The Shock—Adjusted Federal Surplus
In order to evaluate the government’s ﬁscal policy, one would like to decompose movements in
the primary surplus into those resulting from exogenous shocks (e.g. business cycle ﬂuctuations,
unanticipated growth slowdowns) and those induced by signiﬁcant shifts in “ﬁscal stance”. In
this section we discuss a decomposition method that we ﬁrst introduced in Lloyd-Ellis and Zhu
(2001). Let zt be the state vector that summarizes the exogenous shocks in period t.
We assume that the government’s primary surplus in period t c a nb ed e c o m p o s e di n t ot w o
parts:
St = Γt¯ yt + Ft(zt). (1)
where ¯ yt represents trend GNP, Γt denotes permanent (i.e. non—shock related) components of the
ﬁscal surplus and Ft(zt) components of the ﬁscal surplus that are shock—related. We interpret
signiﬁcant and persistent changes in Γt as being associated with changes in the ﬁscal stance of
the government.
Let st = St/¯ yt,a n dft(zt)=Ft(zt)/¯ yt. The ratio of the primary surplus to trend output can
then be expressed as
st = Γt + ft(zt). (2)
In general, the state vector zt may contain variables that are diﬃcult to identify or not directly
observable. Let Xt be a vector of observables that are correlated with the state vector zt.U s i n g
4linear approximation we can express ft(zt) as follows:
ft(zt)=a0Xt + εt,
where εt is the residual that represents the shocks that are not captured by the observables. Thus,
the primary surplus can be expressed as
st = Γt + a0Xt + εt. (3)
So, the ﬁrst step in our decomposition method is to identify the vector of observables, Xt.O n c e
these variables are identiﬁed, we can then use regression to estimate the shock dependence vector
a. Finally, given the estimated a, we adjust surplus for shocks by simply subtracting a0Xt from
the actual surplus st.S o ,t h eshock-adjusted surplus is deﬁned as b st = st − a0Xt.
The traditional cyclically-adjusted surplus is a special case of the shock-adjusted surplus that
we deﬁned above when the variables in Xt are identiﬁed as cyclical deviations of unemployment
and output from their "natural" levels. Although, measurement of the natural levels of output
and unemployment is always problematic, one common proxy is to use a backward moving average
of the actual levels. Column 1 in Table 1 presents the results from a regression of the primary
surplus relative to trend GNP on three “traditional variables”: YGAP, the percentage deviation
between current real GNP and a 1—year backward moving average of real GNP; UGAP, the
diﬀerence between the current rate of unemployment and a 1—year backward moving average;
and MAU, the moving average of the unemployment rate. We have included the latter term
to capture longer term movements in unemployment which may have impacts on government
expenditures.1 The regression uses quarterly data over the period 1961:1—2003:4.
As can be seen from the results, while all of these variables are signiﬁcantly related to the
surplus they do not account for much variation in it. Perhaps not surprisingly therefore, as Figure
2 illustrates, the predicted primary surplus does not capture what we might ap r i o r ibelieve to
be important exogenous movements in the primary surplus. While it picks up that sharp swing
i n t oad e ﬁcit position following the 1981-2 recession (reﬂecting what turned out to be a persistent
increase in unemployment), this seems to be the only evidence of a relationship. Although,
1Including the moving average of real GNP is conceptually problematic because it is obviously trending upwards.
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Figure 3: Traditional Cyclical Adjustment
our approach here is not particularly sophisticated, this picture is in fact representative of a wide
variety of similar approaches to cyclical adjustment. (See, e.g., Chapter 27 of Blanchard, Jonhson,
and Melino, 2003.)
The failure of the standard cyclically-adjusted surplus in capturing policy changes is not un-
expected. For the decomposition method to work well, the observable vector Xt should satisfy at
least two conditions: (1) it contains variables that can capture a signiﬁcant portion of exogenous
shocks that aﬀect the surplus so that we can more conﬁdently attribute changes in shock-adjusted
surplus to policy changes, and (2) it only contains variables that are exogenous to ﬁscal policy
changes so that any policy changes will be captured in the shock-adjusted surplus. The shock
variables used in the traditional cyclically-adjusted surplus do not satisfy either of these con-
ditions. As we pointed out, the cyclical indicators do not capture much of the variation in the
surplus. Furthermore, it is likely that shifts in domestic growth and unemployment are sometimes
induced by changes in ﬁscal policy, so that they cannot be thought as exogenous.
Here we consider an alternative approach to adjusting the surplus for exogenous shocks (cycli-
cal and non—cyclical). We use indices of the market returns on a set of internationally traded
ﬁnancial assets to identify shocks to the surplus. If global asset markets were complete, then it
6would be possible to replicate the impact of all global economic shocks using some combination
of market returns. This is sometimes referred to in the ﬁnance literature as the “spanning” prop-
erty (see Duﬃe, 1986), and is analogous to the use of relative prices to infer sectoral productivity
shocks under the assumption of competitive markets (e.g. investment—speciﬁc technical change).
While, in reality, such markets are unlikely to be complete, we take this as a ﬁrst approximation.
The market return indices that we consider have been used extensively in the ﬁnance literature
to represent underlying factors in stock market returns and to capture cyclical activity in the US.
Since Canada is a small open economy, it is not unreasonable to assume that these international
variables are not inﬂuenced by the government’s ﬁscal policy.
The asset return variables that we use are the value weighted index of returns (VWR) on the
New York stock exchange, the dividend yield (DIV) on the value weighted index (measured as a
1—year backward moving average of dividends divided by the stock price), the yield on 10 year
government bonds (LONGR), the 3—month Treasury bill rate (TBILL), and a 1—year backward
moving average of the Treasury bill rate (TBMA). These variables, or linear combinations of
them, have been found to forecast US asset returns and are discussed in more detail in Campbell
(1996). For our purposes, we view these variables as picking up key components of the shocks
aﬀecting the world economy. Some of these shocks may be expectational in nature, while others
are productivity related.
In Column 2 of Table 1 we run the simple linear regression given in (3) on quarterly data over
the period 1961:1—2003:4, where now Xt is the vector of de—meaned asset returns. Note that we
use trend rather than actual GNP, so that all of the variation in st is coming from the numerator.
Moreover, the primary surplus is measured in US$ by converting at the spot exchange rate.2
This regression illustrates the striking fact that two thirds of the variation in the surplus can
be replicated by a simple linear combination of these asset returns. Figure 3 shows the actual
and ﬁtted primary surplus implied by this relationship. In column 3 we also include the more
traditional cyclical adjustment variables. As can be seen, although the unemployment variables
remain marginally signiﬁcant, these variables add little in terms of explanatory power.
2This is necessary for the valuation procedures discussed subsequently. Moreover, it implies that the regression
will also pick up any shocks to the exchange rate captured by the ﬁnancial variables. Note that the results do not
change qualitatively when measured the surplus in Canadian dollars.
7Figure 4 depicts the residuals, which may be viewed as an estimate of the shock—adjusted
surplus. Although, this series exhibits considerable volatility, the adjusted surplus tends to exhibit
much less persistence than the actual surplus. One exception to this general rule, which stands
out, occurs in the late 1980s when the shock—adjusted primary surplus becomes persistently large
and positive for several years. According to our interpretation, this period stands out as one
when there was a signiﬁcant tightening in the ﬁscal stance of the government. To explore this
interpretation further, we ran the same regression but included a dummy variable which took on
the value 1 during the period 1987:1 to 1991:4, and zero otherwise. As the results in Column
4i n d i c a t e ,t h ec o e ﬃcient on this dummy is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level and suggests
that the surplus averaged over one percentage point higher than predicted by the shocks.
There are several reasons to suspect that there may have been a signiﬁcant change in the
ﬁscal stance of the Canadian government during the late—1980s. These include the rapidly rising
debt, the associated pressure from ﬁnancial markets and a shift to a more conservative role
for government. As Fortin (1999) notes “The ﬁscal authorities made a ﬁrst attempt at ﬁscal
consolidation in 1985—87, largely based on an increase in the overall tax rate from 32 to 35
percent of GNP.”
In interpreting this relationship and in using it for our purposes, we must ﬁrst address two
questions: is this relationship stable over time and is it simply the result of some spurious rela-
tionship due to trends in the variables? Column 5 of Table 1 documents the results of estimating
the model over the ﬁrst half of the sample period 1961:1 to 1982:2. As can be seen the coeﬃcient
estimates are fairly robust to this truncation of the sample period. The fact that we are able to
identify these parameters ex ante suggests that our empirical speciﬁcation should provide a useful
basis for a conditional forecast of the surplus. Indeed, a forecast conditional only on the realized
asset returns, performs reasonably well in replicating the actual surplus in the post—sample period
1982:3:1 to 2003:4. This conditional forecast replicates over 80% of the variation in the actual
surplus.
Although there are no obvious long term trends in the data, standard unit—root test applied to
the surplus and the asset return indices cannot reject the possibility of non—stationarity. Although,
these tests are well known to lack power in ﬁnite samples, it is possible that the strong relationship
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Figure 4: Shock—Adjustment with Asset Returns









Figure 5: The Shock—Adjusted Surplus
9identiﬁed above reﬂects spurious correlations due to trends and/or random walks in the data.
However, using standard cointegration tests, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there does
exist a meaningful stationary long run relationship between the primary surplus and all of the
asset returns.3 Column 6 reports the parameter estimates from the cointegrating vector implied
by an error—correction model. As may be seen, the estimates are almost identical to those implied
by the OLS regression, suggesting that these partial correlations are not spurious.
Based on these empirical results, we interpret the Canadian government’s surplus process as
follows: Under the ﬁscal policy regime that was in place in the 1960s and 1970s, exogenous ﬁscal
shocks accounted for about 70% of the variation in the primary surplus. Until the mid—1970s, the
combination of the policy regime and the shocks had resulted in positive surpluses on average.
Beginning in the mid—1970s, however, the exogenous shocks caused a sustained period of deﬁcits
and resulted in the rising debt under the original policy rule. Instead of adjusting its ﬁscal policy
immediately in response to the deﬁcits and rising debt, the government’s ﬁscal stance did not
change signiﬁcantly until late in 1986 when it adjusted the surplus level upward for about 4 years.
This adjustment, along with more favorable exogenous shocks, resulted in a return to positive
primary surpluses in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Interestingly, our results suggest that this
tight ﬁscal regime ended prior to the election of Chretien’s liberal government.4
3 Assessing the Sustainability of the Public Debt
What level of the debt—GNP ratio can the Canadian economy aﬀord? This question has been
asked many times in the recent past, but we do not believe it has received a satisfactory answer.
Bruce and Purvis (1985) suggested the concept of “ﬁscal prudence” as a guide for budget policy
in pursuit of a debt-ratio target. Wilson and Dungan (1993) also discuss the conditions for the
“sustainability” of ﬁscal programs, where sustainability means control of the debt ratio. Rudin
and Smith (1994) proposed a simple indicator of sustainability in ﬁscal policy, deﬁn e di nt e r m so f
the present—value budget balance. However, because this deﬁnition does not preclude continuous
3We used the Johansen (trace) test. See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), chapter 20.
4Of course, federal spending and taxation declined substantially under Paul Martin, but the diﬀerence between
them was largely accounted for by the shock variables.
10growth in the debt ratio, a collateral constraint on the debt ratio is required. Curtis (1997) uses
a set of indicators of ﬁscal policy sustainability, suggested by Blanchard (1993), that deﬁne ﬁscal
targets and measure the ﬁscal adjustment required to maintain a constant debt ratio.
Clearly, the debt-GNP ratio that an economy can aﬀord depends on future surpluses, which
are functions of future GNP growth rates, interest rates, and other exogenous shocks, as well
as the ﬁscal policy in the future. For a given ﬁscal policy, whether a certain level of debt-GNP
ratio is viewed sustainable depends crucially on what the expected future surpluses are. For
example, the EC came up with a 60% rule as part of the Stability Pact, which was thought to
be sustainable based on some simple estimates of average growth and interest rates. However, as
recent experience has demonstrated, due to ﬂuctuations in growth and interest rates, a debt—GNP
ratio that was originally thought to be sustainable may become unsustainable when expected
growth and interest rates change.5 As the state of an economy evolves, expectation of future
surpluses may change too. Therefore, it is not meaningful to ask what level of the debt—GNP
ratio can the economy aﬀord independent of the state of the global and domestic economy.
A more useful way to pose the question is: conditional on current forecasts of future sur-
pluses, what debt—GNP ratio will “the market” view as sustainable? We address this question
by computing the market valuation of expected future surpluses under the current ﬁscal stance
and comparing it to the current debt—GNP ratio. The net debt – the diﬀerence between the
actual debt and the estimated market valuation of future surpluses – measures the government’s
capacity to repay its debt if it maintains the existing ﬁscal stance.. The decomposition method
that we discussed in the last section allows us to determine what the process of future surpluses
is. In order to determine the market valuation of the primary surplus, however, we choose a
valuation method, which is based on several assumptions.
3.1 Assumptions for Valuation of Future Surpluses
We assume that there is a complete world ﬁnancial market in which all contingent claims with
payoﬀs (measured in US$) that are functions of zt can be traded. Under this assumption and the
assumption of no—arbitrage, there exists a unique sequence of stochastic discount factors, {Mt}tº0,
5The recent experience of Germany illustrates this point nicely.
11such that the time t price of a contingent claim that pays q(zt) units of the consumption good in








We assume that Canada is a small open economy, so that the stochastic discount factors are
exogenous with respect to domestic agents’ actions. In particular, changes in the domestic gov-
ernment’s ﬁscal policy has no eﬀect on them.
Given our speciﬁcation for the primary surplus in (2), if the government’s ﬁscal stance con-
tinues to be Γ in the future, the present value of the government’s primary surpluses (measured






EtMt+j[Γ + ft+j(zt+j)]¯ yt+j (5)
To convert this to Canadian dollars we simply multiply by the current exchange rate.
To compute this market valuation, we need to specify a process for the stochastic discount
rate applied by the market in valuing future cash—ﬂows. Since movements in this discount rate
will also reﬂect global shocks, an important determinant of the present value is its covariance with
the primary surplus. We take “the market” to be a representative US investor and assume that
the “state of the world” is captured by the asset return indices discussed above. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that the vector ˜ Xt =( X1,t,X 2,t,X 3,t,X 4,t), which consists of the demeaned asset returns
VWR, DIV, LONGR and TBILL, follows a vector autoregressive (VAR) process:
˜ Xt = A˜ Xt−1 + ut (6)
where A is a matrix of coeﬃcients, ut is i.i.d., and ut ∼ N(0,Σ). Note that the vector ˜ Xt does
not include one of the factors we used in Xt –TBMA, the one—year moving average of TBILL.
However, given the estimated process for the asset returns, the value of TBMA can be easily
constructed. Table 2 provides the estimated process using quarterly data from 1961:1 to 2003:4.
3.2 Asset Pricing Model
Let rt be the interest rate on the 3-month Treasury bills, rL
t be the yield on 10-year Treasury
bonds, Rm
t be the nominal return on the market portfolio. Then, the following no—arbitrage
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t =e x p ( X1t).
In our calculations, we extend the term structure model discussed in Campbell and Viceira
(1998) and Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) by allowing the innovation in the stochastic
discount factor to be correlated with the innovations in the shock variables. Speciﬁcally we adopt









σ2 + ωt, ωt ∼ N(0,σ2), (10)
where ωt is i.i.d., ωt ∼ N(0,σ2),a n dE [ωtut]=v. Under this speciﬁcation, the ﬁrst moment
condition (7) is always satisﬁed by construction. We further assume that
ωt = ρ1u1,t + ρ4u4,t. (11)
That is, the innovation in the stochastic discount factor is a linear combination of the innovation





4,u +2 ρ1ρ4σ14,u, (12)
v0 =( ρ1,0,0,ρ4)0Σ. (13)
We calibrate the parameters ρ1 and ρ4 so that the other two moment conditions, (8) and (9), hold
on average over the sample period 1975:1—2003:4.6 For more details on calibration, see Appendix
2.
6The asset pricing models we consider are homoskedastic, which implies that both the term premium and the
equity premium are constant over time. In the data, however, these premiums are time—varying. Therefore, the
calibrated parameters will be dependent on the sample period. Since we are concerned about values during the
1980s and 1990s, we chose 1975:1-2003:4 as the sample period for the calibration exercise.
13Let Dt(Γ) be the stock of government debt (in Cdn. $) at the end of period t, when the ﬁscal
stance is Γ. Then, we have
Dt(Γ)=( 1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − [Γ + ft(zt)]¯ yt. (14)
where rt is the eﬀective real interest rate on government debt. We deﬁne the real “net debt” as the
real debt minus the present value of future surpluses under the existing tax policy, Dt(Γ)−Vt(Γ).
The net debt measures the government’s ability to repay its debt if it retains the existing tax
policy.
Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of our estimate of the present value of future surpluses as a
percentage of GNP in comparison with the debt—GNP ratio. As can be seen, while the debt—GNP
ratio fell until the mid 70s and then rose until the mid—90s, the present value under the normal
tax regime fell throughout the period until the late 80s. The net debt, the diﬀerence between
these two, rose throughout reaching the critical level of 5% in 1987.
It is our view that the government reached an upper bound on the net debt by the end of
1986, which is when our earlier estimates suggest a signiﬁcant shift in ﬁscal stance took place.
This is the point at which the net debt—GNP ratio reached a level that was deemed unsustainable
by investors, given the current state of the world and the existing tax policy. Once the policy
adjustment took place, the net debt—GNP ratio then fell to a sustainable level. The estimated
net debt—GNP ratio iby the end of 1986 was approximately 5%. That is, the market viewed the
debt as unsustainable when it reached a level that exceeded the present value of future surplus,
under the existing tax policy, by about 5% of GNP.
This approach to assessing the sustainability of the debt is much more useful than ﬁxed rules
such as those of the Maastricht treaty or indeed strict budget—balance rules. The Maastricht
Treaty level of 60% is based on an estimate of an economy’s steady—state capacity to pay given
some “normal” ﬁscal regime. In a long—run steady state, the present value of future surpluses
would be a constant fraction of GNP, so that our deﬁnition would be equivalent to a Maastricht—
type rule. However, in the short—run, if growth prospects are bad and interest rates are high, a
much lower debt—GNP ratio should be considered sustainable. Alternatively, in goods times a
higher level can be sustained. Thus, our approach is much more ﬂexible and, hence, more realistic.
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Figure 6: Debt and the Value of Future Surpluses under a given ﬁscal regime
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Figure 7: The Net Debt
15The Maastricht rules specify some margins such that the debt can violate the upper bound for
short periods. Although this is similar in spirit to our use of a bound on the net debt—GNP ratio,
it is rather ad hoc.
4 Hedging Against Shocks to the Surplus
According to the optimal dynamic taxation theories of Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983),
tax rates should be maintained at relatively constant levels and should not be used to oﬀset all
of the exogenous shocks to the primary surplus. For political and institutional reasons, ﬁscal
authorities may not be able to adjust ﬁscal policy instantaneously. In the absence of state
contingent borrowing and lending, however, a stable ﬁscal policy may become unsustainable as
the eﬀects of the exogenous shocks accumulate and result in a rising debt, which could force the
government to drastically raise taxes and cut spending in order to reduce the debt. The more
volatile is the primary surplus, the more likely it is that the tax rate will have to be increased in
the future. Given that much of the variation in the surplus can be replicated by the return on
a portfolio of international securities, could the government mitigate the impact of these ﬁscal
shocks by hedging the risk? Moreover, under what conditions would such a policy be desirable?
In a recent article, Lloyd-Ellis and Zhu (2001), we investigate the potential role for systematic
ﬁscal risk management as part of the Canadian government’s overall debt policy.
If Canada can be represented as a small open economy, the rate at which the market discounts
future cash ﬂows is exogenous with respect to domestic agents’ actions. Furthermore, if world
ﬁnancial markets can be viewed as reasonably complete, aggregate welfare can be measured as the
discounted present value of future GNP. For any given ﬁscal policy, investment decisions should
then be made so as to maximize the present market value of production wealth. With complete
markets, the government’s ﬁscal policy aﬀects aggregate welfare only through its impact on the
present value of production, not from smoothing consumption. Suppose the government taxes
output (net of depreciation). For a given eﬀective tax rate, the debt may increase rapidly if the
surplus process experiences a large negative shock. Ex ante, the government can avoid some of
these negative shocks through hedging.
16We considered a simple hedging strategy that eﬀectively replaces a volatile component of the
primary surplus with a deterministic cash—ﬂow that is a constant percentage of nominal GNP,
and which has the same present value. We restrict our analysis to hedging strategies that are
potentially feasible to implement in practice. To do so, we require the hedging to be done with
nominal securities rather than real or inﬂation indexed securities. To avoid potential moral hazard
problems, we further require the US dollar value of the cash—ﬂow from the hedging portfolio to be
a ﬁxed function of the market returns and unaﬀected by the domestic government’s ﬁscal policy
changes. One way to implement such a hedging strategy is by entering into an Index—Linked—
Swap with investors. Various kinds of Index—Linked—Swaps have now been widely traded by many
ﬁnancial institutions, although not with inﬁnite maturity (we discuss the potential problems of
implementing such a swap below).
By diversifying the market risk, the debt process under hedging becomes less volatile. How-
ever, whether the net debt is less likely to become unsustainable under hedging depends on the
ﬁnancial risk premium that must be paid to investors to absorb the risk. When the stochastic
discount rate co—varies positively with the hedged component of the primary surplus, which it
does, the government must pay a risk—premium for downloading the risk to investors. In this
case, the cash—ﬂow the government receives is actually negative. Although hedging makes the
debt process less volatile, the debt will grow faster on average under hedging if the size of this
negative cash—ﬂow is too large. This is analogous to the standard trade oﬀ between risk and
return.
In order to quantify the hedging cost (and to compute the expected present value of GNP),
we speciﬁed a joint stochastic process for the shock variables, the discount factor, the eﬀective
real interest rate on domestic government debt, and domestic productivity growth. In addition
to the assumptions already made in Section 3, we also assume that both domestic productivity
growth and the eﬀective real interest rate are linear functions of the state variables. Assuming
a capital share of 36% and a quarterly depreciation rate of 2%, we calibrate the productivity
growth process so that the implied stochastic process followed by the output growth generated
by the model matches that in the Canadian data.
We computed the percentage gain in the present value of GNP arising from hedging under a
17range of assumptions on parameters and initial conditions. We ﬁnd that, although the expected
ﬁnancial cost of hedging is 0.14% of GNP, the percentage increase in production wealth is between
0.36 and 0.63% (after factoring in the hedging cost). At ﬁrst glance these gains, on the order
of one half of one percent, may appear small. However, it should be realized that this is a half
percent gain in GNP every quarter into the indeﬁnite future. In comparison with other tax
reforms this quite a substantial gain. For example, estimates of the gains from a reduction in
capital taxes in the US are estimated to be at most 1%, but Robert Lucas (1990) has described
them as the biggest free lunch ever.
Approximately 50% of the cumulative gains in GNP arise because, under our benchmark
policy rule, hedging makes the high tax regime less likely to occur. The remaining 50% of the
gains are due to diversiﬁcation: the fact that high tax rates are more likely to occur in states
where the deadweight loss due to taxation is low. While, in the absence of political and other
constraints on government policy, this benchmark rule is clearly sub—optimal, it is consistent with
our empirical observations and implies that the government’s present value budget constraint is
satisﬁed. Alternative policy rules that we considered reduced the gains from hedging because
they reduce the likelihood of low taxes by more than they reduce the likelihood of high taxes.
However, when the present value budget constraint is imposed, the reduction in the gain in
production wealth is small, because of the gains that remain from diversiﬁcation.
These results from our 2001 paper are based on the relationship between the surplus and the
asset returns estimated up to 1994:4. In section 2 we estimated the same relationship up to 2003:4.
Strikingly, the addition of 9 years of quarterly observations did not change these estimates, re—
enforcing our earlier claim of parameter stability. It follows that the estimated welfare gains from
hedging described above would remain unchanged. Of course, as with any welfare evaluation, our
estimates are sensitive to the speciﬁcation of our theoretical model. Moreover, we made a number
of strong assumptions regarding the implementation of the strategy, which we address below.
4.1 Implementation Issues
Our analysis abstracts from several interesting and potentially important issues regarding the
implementation of a ﬁscal risk management strategy. The hedging strategy that we considered
18requires the government to enter into an index—linked swap with an inﬁnite maturity. It would be
interesting to see if the strategy can be replicated with more conventional ﬁnancial instruments.
There is also the issue of default risk that is often associated with swaps of long maturity. In
our 2001 paper we dealt with this problem to some extent by having the payoﬀso ft h es w a p
denominated in US dollars. This eliminates the possibility of partial default by the Canadian
government through inﬂation. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of direct or indirect
default by the government through other means, and it would be interesting to evaluate the
welfare gains from hedging by taking into account credit risk explicitly. Note, however, that
hedging should reduce the default risk premium already implicit in the eﬀective interest rate on
the debt, thereby oﬀsetting the increased cost of hedging.
Perhaps the biggest problem with implementing a systematic hedging strategy is the issue of
time—consistency. We have assumed that once the government decides to implement the hedging
strategy, it will stick to it in the future. However, as our simulations show, the gains from hedging
depend crucially on the initial level of the net debt. A hedging strategy that is welfare improving
ex ante may become welfare reducing ex post if a series of adverse and unhedgable shocks occur
that cause the net debt to increase signiﬁcantly in the future. In this sense ﬁscal risk management
may become politically unpalatable.
One solution to these problems that we are currently working on, is to vary the maturity
structure in of the debt in a way which, at least partially, replicates the hedge. Since the asset
returns that are important in our analysis are all related to diﬀerent parts of the yield curve, it
should be possible to systematically vary the maturity of new debt issues in a way that oﬀsets
cyclical variations to the primary surplus. The degree to which this can be done is limited by the
quantity of new debt issued each period relative to the maturity structure of the existing stock.
However, the transactions costs involved in implementing such a strategy may be lower than for
direct hedging. Boothe and Reid (1992) and Missale and Blanchard (1994) also discuss the scope
for reducing the costs of debt servicing by varying the maturity structure appropriately.
195C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Government cash ﬂows are subject to unavoidable ﬁscal shocks that are outside the control of the
ﬁscal authorities. In this paper we have argued that many of the shocks to the Canadian federal
surplus can be replicated using a linear combination of internationally traded asset returns. We
argue that using these asset returns to cyclically adjust the federal surplus is both conceptually
appealing and quantitatively superior to traditional methods of adjustment. We also show that
it is possible to approximte the surplus process over the last four decades as a stationary function
of these shocks with an abrupt regime shift between 1987 and 1991. Our results are consistent
with the hypothesis that the rise in public debt experienced by Canada was the result of a series
of negative shocks in the 1970s and 1980s, and a long delay in the adjustment of ﬁscal policy in
response to the shocks.
The strong and stable correlation between the primary surplus and these asset return indices
also provides a basis for a ﬂexible and simple method for determining the implicit market as-
sessment of the sustainability of the public debt under a given policy stance. Using 1987 as a
benchmark we infer that the maximum sustainable diﬀerence between the debt and the present
value of future surplus to be about 5% of GNP. This rule is more ﬂexible and realistically achiev-
able than ﬁxed debt—GNP ratios because it is conditional on market forecasts of future surpluses
and the current stance of government ﬁscal policy.
Although some ﬁscal shocks could be oﬀset by varying tax rates and other policy parameters,
this would create further distortions in the economy. The alternative of intertemporal smoothing
through debt ﬁnancing is ultimately unsustainable. Because of this conﬂict between stability and
sustainability, systematic ﬁscal risk management might be beneﬁcial as part of the government’s
overall debt management strategy. We discussed the feasibility of this, and argued that there
are substantial potential gains from ﬁscal risk management in terms of increased sustainability,
reduced tax rates and higher expected per capita GNP.
20Table 1 — Adjusting the Primary Surplus for Shocks
Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6
VWR – -0.038* -0.038* -0.040* -0.058* -0.038
(0.010) (0.011) (.009) (0.011)
DIV – -1.21* -1.43* -1.22* -1.48* -1.20
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14)
LONGR – -0.36* -0.13 -0.42* -0.42* -0.36
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09)
TBILL – 0.21* 0.12* 0.23* 0.20* 0.20
(0.04) (0.04) (.04) (0.04)
TBMA – 0.23* 0.23* 0.25* 0.38* 0.23
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
MAU -0.24* – -0.19* – – –
(0.05) (0.04)
UGAP -0.61* – -0.21* – – –
(0.16) (0.11)
YGAP -0.07* – -0.04 – – –
(0.035) (0.02)
DUM – – – 0.012* – –
(0.002)
NOBS 172 172 172 172 86 172
R2 0.19 0.67 0.72 0.74 0.75
D—W 0.28 0.74 0.74 1.04 1.35
Notes:
(1) Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
(2) * indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level
21Table 2: VAR Estimates
VWR DIV TBILL LONGR
VWR(-1) 0.18 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.004) (0.01) (0.02)
DIV(-1) 2.23 0.85 -0.07 -0.11
(0.68) (0.04) (0.09) (0.18)
TBILL(-1) -0.71 0.03 0.91 0.41
(0.40) (0.02) (0.05) (0.11)
LONGR(-1) 0.18 0.01 0.05 0.59
(0.28) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08)
Notes:
( 1 )s t a n d a r de r r o r sa r eg i v e ni np a r e n t h e s i s .
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24Appendix 1: The Data
Fiscal Variables
The quarterly primary surplus was calculated as the diﬀerence between total federal revenues
and outlays less interest payments on the debt, as published by Statistics Canada (CANSIM
II). For institutional reasons, this data exhibits considerable seasonal variation. Speciﬁcally,
annual crown corporation cash ﬂows are attributed only to the second quarter yielding a large
“spike”. We therefore used seasonally adjusted data. The surplus data does not include charges
and subsidies relating to the Petroleum Compensation fund. Debt ﬁgures are from Statistics
Canada’s CANSIM II database and refer to gross federal Canadian debt. This does not include
oﬀ-balance sheet items, such as the Canada pension plan.
Asset Returns
VWR is the index of value—weighted returns on the NYSE taken from the CRSP tape. DIV is
the dividend yield on the NYSE from the CRSP tape. LONGR is the nominal interest rate on
10 year US. government bonds. TBILL is the nominal 3—month US. treasury bill rate. TBMA
is a one—year ﬁxed—weight moving average of TBILL. All of these returns were converted into
Canadian dollars using the spot U.S.—Canadian exchange rate taken from CITIBASE. Note that
these returns should therefore be interpreted as the return in Canadian dollars on each U.S. dollar
invested.
Other data
Unemployment data is take from OECD, Main Economic Indicators, various issues. The exchange
rate and GNP data are taken from CANSIM II.
25Appendix 2: Calibrating the Two—factor Asset Pricing Model
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26We choose the values of ρ1 and ρ4 so that they are the solutions to the equations (18) and (21).
We do so by ﬁrst using (18) to express ρ1 as a linear function of ρ4 and substituting it into
equation (21). We then numerically look for the value of ρ4 that solves equation (21).
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